The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources
Patrick Laplagne and
David Appels ()
Additional contact information
Chris Chan: Productivity Commission
Patrick Laplagne: Productivity Commission
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.
Keywords: Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM - PC; to print on HP;
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Working Paper: The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0304007
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