The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

Paulo Monteiro

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions

Keywords: first-price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2004-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - Pdf file; prepared on Windows 2000; to print on hp; pages: 6; figures: none
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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0403/0403001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The set of equilibria of first-price auctions (2006)
Working Paper: The set of equilibria of first-price auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0403001

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