Spatial Proximity and Complementarities in the Trading of Tacit Knowledge
Neslihan Aydogan and
Thomas Lyon ()
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
We model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowledge is unverifiable and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity important. When there are sufficient “complementarities” in knowledge exchange, successful exchange is facilitated if firms can meet in a central location,thereby economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are small,however, a central location may be undesirable because it is more vulnerable to cheating than a structure involving bilateral travel between firms. We believe that our framework may help explain the structure and stability of multimember technology trading coalitions such as Sematech and Silicon Valley.
Keywords: Tacit Knowledge; Clusters; Knowledge Trading; Complementarities. Spatial Proximity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 O3 R1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-ent, nep-geo, nep-ino and nep-ure
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 38
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Journal Article: Spatial proximity and complementarities in the trading of tacit knowledge (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0404004
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