Optimal Auditing Under Intermediated Contracting

Wolfgang Gick

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper builds on Faure-Grimaud and Martimort’s [Economics Letters 71 (2001) 75-82] analysis of intermediated contracting. I argue that intermediated contracting permits one form of auditing, in which the sub-contract offered to the firm is examined, contingent on the intermediary’s report. Auditing reduces the intermediary’s rent and increases allocative efficiency.

Keywords: Intermediated Contracting; Grand Contract; Optimal Auditing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2004-11-18
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 7
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0411/0411003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0411003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).