Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
This note concerns bidding in a hybrid first-price and second-price auction. The winning bidder sometimes pays his bid and sometimes pays an amount determined by the next highest bid. In internet auctions where bidders wait until the end of the auction to bid the auction reduces to a sealed-bid auction and the bid function we derive may be relevant in such cases.
Keywords: sniper bidding; bid increments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
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Working Paper: Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0506008
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