Economics at your fingertips  

Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions

Richard Cox

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: This note concerns bidding in a hybrid first-price and second-price auction. The winning bidder sometimes pays his bid and sometimes pays an amount determined by the next highest bid. In internet auctions where bidders wait until the end of the auction to bid the auction reduces to a sealed-bid auction and the bid function we derive may be relevant in such cases.

Keywords: sniper bidding; bid increments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06-24
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from EconWPA
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().

Page updated 2018-07-14
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0506008