Corruption and Political Competition
Richard Damania and
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Richard Damania: Adelaide University
Erkan Yalcin: Yeditepe University
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.
Keywords: Corruption; Lobbying; Political Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0510012
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