Coase Competition and Compensation

Hal Varian ()

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I show that the Pigovian solution to a simple externalities problem and a particular Coasian solution can be viewed as competitive equilibria from different initial endowments. I also describe the ``compensation mechanism,'' a mechanism that implements either the Coasian or Pigovian solution as the outcome of an economically natural bargaining game.

JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01-18
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Related works:
Journal Article: Coase, competition, and compensation (1995)
Working Paper: Coase, Competitions, and Compensation (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9401002

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