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Discrete Public goods with incomplete information

Flavio Menezes, Paulo Monteiro and Akram Temimi
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Akram Temimi: AL

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions that increasing equilibria of contribution games and subscription games must satisfy for general distribution functions. We then characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the subscription game when valuations are uniformly distributed. Our analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the equilibrium outcomes of the two games. In fact, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a general family of distributions.

Keywords: public goods; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D79 D89 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999-01-21, Revised 1999-07-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: Type of Document - Postscript file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Discrete public goods with incomplete information (1999) Downloads
Working Paper: Discrete Public Goods With Incomplete Information (1998)
Working Paper: Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information (1998) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9901004

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