Irrigation Technology Adoption and Gains from Water Trading under Asymmetric Information
Chokri Dridi and
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We develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous farmers and between farmers and water authorities; farmers’ heterogeneity is defined by a mix of land quality and knowledge. We find that adverse selection reduces the adoption of modern irrigation technology. We also show that even with asymmetric information, incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties. This suggests that under asymmetric information, a thin secondary market improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern irrigation technologies.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Irrigation technology; Technology adoption; Water trading. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P Q Z (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35. Forthcoming in: American Journal of Agricultural Economics
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Journal Article: Irrigation Technology Adoption and Gains from Water Trading under Asymmetric Information (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0409005
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