Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries

Lilyan Fulginiti and Jason Shogren

Others from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The present paper explores why farmers are taxed in poor countries and subsidized in rich countries. Using the economic theory of contests to come to an understanding of the incentives for agricultural protectionism, we first sketch a framework for an excludable and rivalrous rent. We then apply this framework to agricultural protectionism in developing countries.

Keywords: Agricultural protection; public choice; collective action; excludable and rivalrous rent; developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2005-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 7
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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/othr/papers/0502/0502010.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries (1994)
Working Paper: Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries (1994)
Working Paper: Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries (1994)
Journal Article: Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries (1992)
Working Paper: Agricultural Protection in Developing Countries (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0502010

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