Vote Buying

Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky

Others from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

Keywords: vote buying; elections; campaign promises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2005-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/othr/papers/0503/0503006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Vote buying (2005)
Working Paper: Vote Buying (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0503006

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