Unanimity Rule Constitutions

Hans Gersbach and Ulrich Erlenmaier
Additional contact information
Ulrich Erlenmaier: University of Heidelberg

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.

Keywords: Unanimity rule; incomplete social contract; constitutional treatment rules; provision of public projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2000-08-04
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: .
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0004/0004007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0004007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).