The problem of succession

Leon Taylor ()

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The self-interested ruler will not name a successor. Instead, he will prefer to rely on a tacit rule of succession, in which longevity confers legitimacy. [JEL D72, D81]

Keywords: succession; leadership; organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2001-05-06
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word 3.51; prepared on Compaq Presario 1200; to print on HP; pages: 15; figures: included
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0105/0105001.pdf (application/pdf)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0105/0105001.tex (application/x-tex)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0105/0105001.ps.gz (application/postscript)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0105001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).