Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism
Daniel Kaufmann (),
John McMillan and
Christopher Woodruff ()
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden â€˜unofficialâ€™ activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output. Ã“ 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
JEL-codes: H26 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-tra
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 26 ; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism (2000)
Working Paper: Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0308004
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().