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On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within

Michelle Garfinkel ()

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a positive analysis of stable group formation, highlighting the role of conflict management within groups. The analysis is based on a model of sequential conflict, starting with a "winner- take-all" contest for control of some resource. When a group forms, members pool their efforts in that contest and, if successful, apply the resource to a joint production process. While reducing the severity of conflict over the contestable resource relative to the case of individual conflict, the formation of groups adds another layer of conflict---that is, one between the members of the winning group over the distribution of their joint product. The effectiveness of conflict management in enabling groups to resolve this second layer of conflict in more "peaceful" ways involving less "social waste" has some important implications for the equilibrium structure of groups as well as for the allocation of resources.

Keywords: Endogenous group formation; competitive appropriation; conflict management. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 C72 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2003-12-18, Revised 2004-03-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; pages: 38; figures: none
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39) Track citations by RSS feed

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Journal Article: On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within (2004) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0312005

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