Candidate Quality

Panu Poutvaara and Tuomas Takalo

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high.

Keywords: Politicians' competence; Career concerns; Campaigning costs; Rewards for elected officials; Citizen-candidate models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D79 J24 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2004-06-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 34. First version: May 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0406/0406009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Candidate quality (2007)
Working Paper: Candidate quality (2007)
Working Paper: Candidate Quality (2004)
Working Paper: Candidate Quality (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0406009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).