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Revealed Preferences for Car Tax Cuts: an Empirical Study of Perceived Fiscal Incidence

David Feldman and Samuel H Baker
Additional contact information
Samuel H Baker: College of William & Mary

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Voting in an election in which elimination of the local car tax is the central issue shows how a highly visible universal tax cut can prevail in the electoral process even if benefits are skewed toward upper income households. These results are consistent with positive models of fiscal structure choice in which fiscal systems are the consequence of support maximizing politicians attempting to supply net benefits to easily identifiable interest groups without generating significant opposition from other groups.

Keywords: personal property taxes; tax revolt; targeted universalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2004-11-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0411/0411002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Revealed preferences for car tax cuts: an empirical study of perceived fiscal incidence (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Revealed Preference for Car Tax Cuts: An Empirical Study of Perceived Fiscal Incidence (2004) Downloads
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