Judgment aggregation by quota rules
Franz Dietrich and
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
It is known that majority voting among several individuals on logically interconnected propositions may generate irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds some (proposition-specific) threshold. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions under which their outcomes satisfy various rationality conditions. We also consider sequential quota rules, which adjudicate propositions sequentially, letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. While ensuring rationality, sequential rules may be path-dependent. We characterize path-independence and prove its equivalence to strategy- proofness under mild conditions. Our results generalize earlier (im)possibility theorems.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation; quota rules; collective rationality; path-dependence; strategy-proofness; formal logic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22
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Journal Article: Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0501005
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