Shortlisting

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study the properties of decisions made by committees who select alternatives by constructing shortlists. We find that even when committees are themselves rational, such procedures may not give rise to rational choices. A necessary condition for this to occur is disagreement between committees. However, we delimit substantially the extent of `irrationality' that these procedures allow.

Keywords: Committees; shortlist; menu-dependence; cycles of choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2005-03-15, Revised 2006-03-23
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0503006

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