Pushing the Prize Up, A Few Notes on Al-Qaeda's Reward Structure and the choice of Casualties

Raul Caruso () and Andrea Locatelli
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Andrea Locatelli: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent rewarding a prize (membership) to its clients (cells and would-be cells). Although this principle makes the organization hardly visible and virtually impenetrable, we contend that in the long term such a logic is non-sustainable

Keywords: Conflict; Al Qaeda; Terrorism; microeconomic theory; prize; contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2005-07-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 5
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0507008

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