A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")
Yasuhito Tanaka ()
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Recently Eliaz(2004) has presented a unified framework to study (Arrovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the concept of 'preference reversal'. He showed that social choice rules which satisfy the property of preference reversal and a variant of the Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as its special cases. We present a concise proof of his theorem using elementary concepts of algebraic topology such as homomorphisms of homology groups of simplicial complexes induced by simplicial mappings.
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2005-10-26, Revised 2005-10-26
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0510021
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