The economics of marriage

Alessandro Cigno

CHILD Working Papers from CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY

Abstract: In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage may induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it may lend credibility to the prospective main earner's promise to compensate the main childcarer when the children will no longer be economically dependent on them. In a community-property jurisdiction, marriage will induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it rules out strategic behaviour. Whatever the matrimonial property regime, reducing the cost or difficulty of obtaining a divorce will have no permanent effect on the divorce rate. In a separate-property jurisdiction, it will encourage marriage, and induce more married women to specialize in market work. Couples should be allowed to choose the matrimonial property regime.

Keywords: divorce; alimony; matrimonial property; commitment; fertility; domestic division of labour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 J13 J16 J24 K30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Marriage (2011)
Working Paper: The Economics of Marriage (2011)
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