 The Political Economy of Intergenerational CooperationCHILD Working Papers from CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY Abstract: 1. Introduction - 2. A normative benchmark. 2.1 Consumption and fertility in the spirit of J.S. Mill. 2.2. Consumption and fertility in the spirit of J. Bentham. 2.3. Normative implications of altruism - 3. The market. 3.1. A life-cycle model. 3.2 A dynastic model .- 4. The family. 4.1 Political economy of the family. 4.1.1. Family constitutions. 4.1.2 Picking a constitution. 4.2. Altruism within the family. 4.3 Heterogeneity, uncertainty, and the demand for attention - 5. Public transfers and population policy. 5.1. The state and the market. 5.2. The state, the market and the family - 6. Education. 6.1. Market equilibrium and education policy. 6.2 Families again - 7. Uncertainty and hidden actions. 7.1. Parents as government agents. 7.2. The government as principal. 7.3. Child bene…ts, scholarships and pensions. - 8 Political acceptability. 8.1. A social compact? 8.2. Direct democracy. 8.2.1. Voting over pensions. 8.2.2. Voting over the public debt. 8.3. Representative democracy. 8.3.1. Lobbying for pensions. 8.3.2. Lobbying for pensions and education.subsidies - 9. Conclusion - References. Keywords: Intergenerational Cooperation; Political Economy; Family; Pensions (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp05_03 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CHILD Working Papers from CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY Contact information at EDIRC. |
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