Extreme inequality aversion without separability

Kristof Bosmans

Public Economics Working Paper Series from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics

Abstract: Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social preferences of the expected utility type. Using an analogous approach, we show that for social preferences not necessarily satisfying the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory, the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly maximin social preferences——i.e., the class of social preferences that give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst off is not indifferent.

Keywords: Inequality aversion; Leximin; Maximin; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Forthcoming in Economic Theory.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Extreme inequality aversion without separability (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpe:papers:extrin

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Public Economics Working Paper Series from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kristof Bosmans ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).