A Political Economy of the Separation of Electoral Origin

Peter Buisseret
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Peter Buisseret: Department of Economics, University of Warwick

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Political constitutions frequently separate the roles of proposer and veto player in policy-making processes. A fundamental distinction lies in whether both oces are subject to direct and separate election, or whether the voter instead may directly elect the holder of only one oce. In the latter case, the voter constitutionally forfeits a degree of ex-post electoral control. Why should she benet from such a relatively coarse electoral instrument? When politicians' abilities are private information, actions taken by one agent provide information to the voter about both agents' types. A system in which the electoral fate of these agents is institutionally fused reduces the incentives of the veto player to build reputation through the specious rejection of the proposer's policy initiatives. This can improve the voter's inference about the types of politicians and her welfare, relative to a system in which the survival of the veto player is institutionally separated from that of the proposer.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1021

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