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Sustainable Debt

Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis and Yiannis Vailakis
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Gaetano Bloise: Yeshiva University
Herakles Polemarchakis: University of Warwick
Yiannis Vailakis: University of Glasgow

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium due solely to the reputation of debtors for repayment; that is, even absent collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. Under incomplete markets, when the rate of interest (net of growth) is recurrently negative, self-insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by he implicit threat of loss of risk-sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates as a form of inside money and, in general, is not valued as a speculative bubble; it is distinct from outside money. Competitive equilibria with self-enforcing debt exist under a suitable hypothesis of gains from trade.

Keywords: Rate of interest; self-enforcing debt; reputational debt; incomplete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-dge
Date: 2018
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