The Race to the Base

Dan Bernhardt, Peter Buisseret and Sinem Hidir
Additional contact information
Peter Buisseret: Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when the election pits a relatively strong party against a weaker party ; when each party faces uncertainty about how voter preferences will evolve during the campaign; and, when each party cares not only about winning a majority, but also about its share of seats in the event that it holds majority or minority status. When the initial imbalance favoring one party is small, each party targets the median voter in the median district, in pursuit of a majority. When the imbalance is moderate, the advantaged party continues to hold the centre-ground, but the disadvantaged party retreats to target its core supporters; it does so to fortify its minority share of seats in the likely event that it fails to secure a majority. Finally, when the imbalance is large, the advantaged party advances toward its opponent, raiding its moderate supporters in pursuit of an outsized majority.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... twerp_1180_hidir.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The Race to the Base (2020)
Working Paper: The Race to the Base (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1180

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