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Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London

Michael Waterson and Jian Xie
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Jian Xie: University of Warwick

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the London bus market, a large market with regular procurement of bus services, for possible collusion using a wide variety of techniques, making use of the data at our disposal. There is little evidence of collusion in bidding for contracts apparent from our data, despite some features of the market that might lead to collusive behaviour.

Keywords: Cartel behaviour; Procurement; Detecting Cartels; Bus market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L41 L92 D22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-ind and nep-law
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1196

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