Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London
Michael Waterson and
Additional contact information
Jian Xie: University of Warwick
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
We investigate the London bus market, a large market with regular procurement of bus services, for possible collusion using a wide variety of techniques, making use of the data at our disposal. There is little evidence of collusion in bidding for contracts apparent from our data, despite some features of the market that might lead to collusive behaviour.
Keywords: Cartel behaviour; Procurement; Detecting Cartels; Bus market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L41 L92 D22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... rp_1196_waterson.pdf
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1196
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().