Positive and Negative Campaigning in Primary and General Elections

Dan Bernhardt and Meenakshi Ghosh

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze primary and general election campaigning. Positive campaigning builds a candidate’s reputation; negative campaigning damages a rival’s. Each primary candidate hopes to win the general election; but failing that, he wants his primary rival to win. We establish that general elections always feature more negative campaigning than positive, as long as reputations are easier to tear down than build up. In contrast, if the effects of primary campaigns strongly persist, primary elections always feature more positive campaigning than negative. This reflects that a primary winner benefits only from his positive primary campaigning in general elections, and negative campaigning by a rival hurts.

Keywords: Primary; general election; negative and positive campaigning; contest; incumbent; challenger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... p_1209_bernhardt.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1209

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