Synchronized Elections,Voter Behavior and Governance Outcomes: Evidence from India
Apurav Yash Bhatiya and
Sabyasachi Das ()
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Vimal Balasubramaniam: Queen Mary, University of London, CEPR, UK and CAGE, University of Warwick
Apurav Yash Bhatiya: University of Warwick
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
We examine whether holding national and state elections simultaneously or sequentially affects voter decisions and consequently, electoral and economic outcomes in India. Synchronized elections increase the likelihood of the same political party winning constituencies in both tiers by 21%. It reduces split-ticket voting, increases the salience of party among voters and shifts voters’ priority to state issues, without signiﬁcantly affecting turnout and winning margin. A model of behaviorally constrained voters with costly information acquisition best explains our results. Finally, synchronization results in insigniﬁcant economic gains. Our ﬁndings have implications for the design of elections to multiple tiers of government.
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Working Paper: Synchronized Elections, Voter Behavior and Governance Outcomes: Evidence from India (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1276
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