In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA's Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan

Monica Martinez-Bravo and Andreas Stegmann
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Andreas Stegmann: University of Warwick

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: In July 2011, the Pakistani public learnt that the CIA had used a vaccination campaign as cover to capture Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban leveraged on this information and launched an anti-vaccine propaganda campaign to discredit vaccines and vaccination workers. We evaluate the effects of these events on immunization by implementing a Difference-in-Differences strategy across cohorts and districts. We find that vaccination rates declined 12 to 20% per standard deviation in support for Islamist parties. These results suggest that information discrediting vaccination campaigns can negatively affect trust in health services and demand for immunization

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA’s Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan (2022)
Working Paper: In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA's Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan (2021)
Working Paper: In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA's Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan (2021)
Working Paper: In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA's Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan (2018)
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