Leader Identity and Coordination

Sonia Bhalotra, Irma Clots-Figueras, Lakshmi Iyer and Joseph Vecci
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Joseph Vecci: University of Gothenburg

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines policy effectiveness as a function of leader identity. We experimentally vary leader religious identity in a coordination game implemented in India, and focus upon citizen reactions to leader identity, controlling for leader actions. We find that minority leaders improve coordination, while majority leaders do not. Alternative treatment arms reveal that affirmative action for minorities reverses this result, while intergroup contact improves the effectiveness of leaders of both identities. We also find that minority leaders are less effective in towns with a history of intergroup conflict. Our results demonstrate that leader and policy effectiveness depend upon citizen reactions, conditioned by social identity and past conflict.

Keywords: Leader identity; religion; coordination failure; affirmative action; intergroup contact; conflict; India JEL Classification: P16; D70, D91, J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... _1350_-_bhalotra.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Leader Identity and Coordination (2023)
Working Paper: Leader identity and coordination (2021)
Working Paper: Leader Identity and Coordination (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1350

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