A Field Study of Donor Behavior in the Iranian Kidney Market

Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi and Daniel Sgroi

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Iran has the world’s only government-regulated kidney market, in which around 1000 individuals go through live kidney-removal surgery annually. We report the results of the first field study of donor behavior in this unique and controversial market. Those who enter the market have low income, typically entering to raise funds. They have lower risk tolerance and higher patience levels than the Iranian average. There is no di erence in rationality from population averages. There is evidence of altruism among participants. This might shed light on the sort of people likely to participate if other nations were to operate such markets.

Keywords: kidney donation; Iranian kidney market; risk; patience; rationality; altruism; generalized axiom of revealed preference; field experiment JEL Classification: I11; I12; I18; C93; D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... erp_1381_-_sgroi.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: A Field Study of Donor Behaviour in the Iranian Kidney Market (2022)
Working Paper: A Field Study of Donor Behavior in the Iranian Kidney Market (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1381

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