The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence
Avinash Dixit ()
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
The theory of large-scale entry into an industry is made complicated by its game-theoretic aspects. Even in the simplest case of one established firm facing one prospective entrant, there are some subtle strategic interactions. The established firm's pre-entry decisions can influence the prospective entrant's view of what will happen if he enters, and the established firm will try to exploit this possibility to its own advantage.
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Journal Article: The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence (1980)
Working Paper: THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT IN ENTRY-DETERRENCE (1979)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:140
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