Optimal Nonlinear Policies for Non-Utilitarian Motives

Jesus Seade

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies optimization by a principal, e.g. a government or a firm, whose choice among social alternatives is constrained to those it can decentralize, as in the nonlinear taxation literature, but whose ranking of these alternative equilibria is not constrained to be of any special form, such as utilitarian or profit-maximising. Accordingly, we shall define welfare directly on the various quantities arising in the economy, on the consumption vectors of consumers in full detail, without necessarily processing this information in any particular way.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1979
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:143

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