Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement

Oliver R. Browne, Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone and Olga Rostapshova
Additional contact information
Oliver R. Browne: The Brattle Group
Ludovica Gazze: University of Warwick
Olga Rostapshova: The University of Chicago

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1 to 14%, decreased water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.

Keywords: Field Experiment; Automated Enforcement; Remote Sensing; Water Conservation JEL Codes: Q25; K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-exp
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... erp_1440_-_gazze.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement (2023)
Working Paper: Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1440

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