Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections

Dan Bernhardt, Stefan Stefan Krasa and Francesco Squintani
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Stefan Stefan Krasa: Department of Economics, University of Illinois
Francesco Squintani: Department of Economics, University of Warwick

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model of strategic voting in a spatial setting with multiple candidates when voters have both expressive and instrumental concerns. The model endogenizes the strategic coordination of voters, yet is flexible enough to allow the analysis of political platform competition by policy-motivated candidates. We characterize all strategic voting equilibria in a three-candidate setting. Highlighting the utility of our approach, we analyze a setting with two mainstream and a spoiler candidate, showing that the spoiler can gain from entering, even though she has no chance of winning the election and reduces the winning probability of her preferred mainstream candidate

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 1489_-_squintani.pdf

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Working Paper: Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1489

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