Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions

Michael Waterson and Olga Wojciechowska

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine bidders’ behaviour in auction sales of the iPhone4 on eBay in the context of a significant shortage of the product at listed price, leading to achieved prices significantly above the posted price, on average. We examine the behaviour of sellers then test the direct prediction of the successive auctions model that bidders increase their bids over successive auctions and are influenced by the effects of information gained from previous auctions, finding that bidders indeed react both to their direct experience and to experience gained from studying previous auctions. In addition, the results are suggestive of bidders being reluctant to reveal their true valuation of the product initially but that they do so only over time. Our results are novel in being able to track individual bidders’ behaviour rather than simply auction outcomes.

Keywords: Repeated auctions; eBay; consumer valuations JEL Codes: L63; L81; D12; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1498

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