When Teachers Break the Rules: Imitation, Reciprocity, and Community Structure in the Transmission of Ethical Behavior

Victor Lavy and Moses Shayo
Additional contact information
Victor Lavy: University of Warwick, Hebrew University, and NBE
Moses Shayo: Hebrew University of Jerusalem and King’s College London

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study how teachers' rule violations in grading affect students' ethical behavior. Using administrative data from high-stakes exams, combining teacher-assigned internal scores with externally graded national exam scores, we track teacher grading violations and subsequent student cheating. We explore three potential mechanisms: imitation (learning that rules can be broken), positive reciprocity (responding favorably to favorable treatment), and negative reciprocity (retaliating against unfavorable treatment). Exploiting within-student variation in exposure to different teachers, we find students are significantly more likely to cheat when teachers break the rules to their detriment (systematically undergrading), consistent with both imitation and negative reciprocity. However, when teachers systematically overgrade, responses vary by community structure. In heterogeneous communities, overgrading increases student cheating, suggesting imitation dominates. In homogeneous communities, students respond by cheating less, consistent with positive reciprocity dominating. This pattern holds across multiple homogeneity measures, including surname concentration and residential clustering. Survey measures of mutual respect and support between students and teachers confirm this pattern.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... /twerp_1604-lavy.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1604

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().