Job Search and the Firm's Wage Offer Decisions: A Model of Null Offers

Martin Chalkley

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper a model of a profit maximising firm's responses to job search is developed. This model explains the determinants of a firm's wage offer and the probability that a firm will be found in a state where it is optimal to make no offer (i.e. a 'null' offer). Comparative statics results for the case of constant returns technology are calculated and the implications of the model for a market chatacterised by search are discussed.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1983
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 78-1988/twerp223.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Job Search and the Firm's Wage Offer Decisions: A Model of Null Offers (1983)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:223

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().