Financing and the Optimal Provision of Public Expenditure by Decentralized Agencies

Robin Boadway, I Horiba and Raghbendra Jha

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: It has realized since Pigou (1947) that if public goods are financed by distortionary taxation, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will exceed the actual resource cost by the marginal deadweight cost of taxation.

Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; PUBLIC EXPENDITURES; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 95-1998/twerp472.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: FINANCING AND THE OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BY DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:472

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