Crime and Drugs: An Economic Approach
Chris Doyle and
Jennifer Smith ()
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We present a model which ties together rational drug consumption, taxation, crime and other drug-related externalities. Drug control policy is addressed using an optimal tax framework. Consumption, possession and production of a drug may be prohibited, legalized or decriminalized. In all regimes illicit production of a drug may take place and drug-related crime occurs. We show that illicit drug production, the price elasticity of demand for a drug, the addictive nature of a drug, the effectiveness of drug enforcement strategies, and income distribution all influence optimal (second best) policy. Prohibition is contrasted with decriminalization and legalization, and where legalization yields a higher welfare than prohibition we show that this can be associated with greater drug-related crime and more drug addiction. The model is discussed in the context of US National Drug Control Strategy.
Keywords: Crime; decriminalization; drugs; externalities; legalization; optimal tax; prohibition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H23 H50 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/crimdrug.pdf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:477
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