A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign States

Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Do emerging economies need a bankruptcy procedure to handle potential debt defaults? Jeff Sachs and John Williamson, for example, say yes. But others, including notably the two Working Groups who issued reports on Crisis Resolution (on behalf of G10 and the Institute of International Finance) say no - mainly on account of "moral hazard" ascribed to debtors. But could the replacement of syndicated bank lending with widely held bond debt under the Brady plan have posed a problem of inter-creditor conflict sufficiently pressing to have tipped the balance in favour of having an orderly procedure?

Keywords: BANKRUPTCY; DEBT; MORAL HAZARD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E51 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE FOR SOVEREIGN STATES (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:483

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