Voting for Taxes and Tax Incentives for Giving
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
We describe a fiscal choice model where individuals vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how tax incentives for giving affect political equilibrium outcomes. We show that the availability of tax incentives can cause a regime switch and induce a low income policymaker to select a private provision regime over a pure public provision regime even when the median voter is a donor.
Keywords: TAXES; PUBLIC GOODS; INCENTIVES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:497
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