Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Jurisdictional Boundaries

Carlo Perroni and Kimberley Scharf

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdictions even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.

Keywords: TAXATION; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 95-1998/twerp498.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Tiebout with politics: capital tax competition and jurisdictional boundaries (2000)
Working Paper: TIEBOUT WITH POLITICS: CAPITAL TAX COMPETITION AND JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:498

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