Implementing Tax Coordination

Amrita Dhillon (), Carlo Perroni and Kimberley Scharf

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. WE focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public goods requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates. If, however, information on jurisdictions' types is private or nonverifiable, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable.

Keywords: TAXATION; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1997
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 95-1998/twerp501.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Implementing tax coordination (1999)
Working Paper: IMPLEMENTING TAX COORDINATION (1997)
Working Paper: Implementing tax co-ordination (1997)
Working Paper: Implementing Tax Coordination
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:501

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