Hidden Corruption

M. Pani

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: While most economic studies on corruption are mainly concerned with its actual occurrence, in this paper we claim that most economic effects rather derive from its mere possibility. When corruption is prevented through an expensive monitoring activity and by offering high incentives, its effects persist although corruption does not actually occur - a situation that may be described as "hidden corruption".

Keywords: CORRUPTION; INCENTIVES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K1 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:506

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