Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm

Dennis Leech

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very widely applied, in part because of the difficulty of computing the indices when there are many players. This paper presents new algorithms for the classical power indices which have been shown to work well in real applications.

Keywords: VOTING; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:510

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