A law of scarcity for games

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: The “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded ; recall, for example, the diamonds and water paradox. In this paper, furthering research initiated in Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504) for matching models, we demonstrate a law of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games.

Keywords: cooperative games; games with side payments (TU games); cyclic monotonicity; law of demand; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A law of scarcity for games (1999)
Working Paper: A law of scarcity for games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:546

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