Asset Ownership and Investment Incentives Revisited

D. de Mesa and Ben Lockwood

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Previous work on the property rights theory of the firm suggests that in the presence of outside options, asset ownership may demotivate managers. This paper shows that this conclusion relies on the assumption that a manager's outside option only depends on her own investment.

Keywords: PROPERTY RIGHTS; MANAGEMENT; INVESTMENTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp562.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Asset Ownership and Investment Incentives Revisited (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:562

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().